wards, as to thefe which were previoufly, emitted by Congrefs:–A matter that we are not bound, nor are we inclined to countenance.
This opinion, unanimoufly formed, mutual confulation, and full deliberation, leads to a more particular confideration of the evidence ; and, if the Jury think that the bills of credit, or any part of them, which were tendered to the Plaintiff on the 29th of March, 1780, were emitted fubfequent to the 29th of January, 1777, they muft only give this tender the effect at common law.
It may be proper here to notice, that these were two bills of thirty dollars each, in the bundle of paper money tendered; and the Plaintiff's counfel has faid, that there (illegible text) bills of that denomination emitted prior to the 29th of January 1777. But he is certainly a thirty dollar bill emitted in 1776; and, therefore this circumftance is by no means conclufive.
But fhould the Jury, upon the whole of the evidence, find, that this tender was made in bills of credit emitted fince the 29th of January, 1777, and fo not an abfolute difcharge of the debt, they will next enquire, in what manner the band ought not to be paid? By the act of the 3d of April, 1781, it is declared, that all debts and contracts entered into between the 1ft of January, 1777, and the 1ft of March, 1781, fhall be liquidated according to the feale of depreciation. The Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to recover the whole Ł 500. in fpecie, but only fo much as that fum in paper money was worth at the time the contract was entered into ; which was on the 24th of April, 1777 : Nor is he entitled to any intereft from the date of the tender until this action (which is to be confidered as a new demand ; was inftituted.
The Jury found a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for Ł272. 3. 4. debt with cofts: from which, it feems, that they were of opinion, that the tender was not made entirely in bills of credit emitted beƒore the 29th oƒ January, 1777; and that purfued the directions of the Court in that alternative.
STEELE verʃus STEELE.
T
HIS was an iffue joined on the facts alledged in a libel for a divorce; and, upon the trial, the CHIEF JUSTICE obferved, that notice ought to be given of the facts intended to be proved under the general allegations of the libel.
RUSH,Juʃtice; I think it would be moft convenient to give notice, that between two fpecific dates, acts of cruelty &c. were intended to be proved.
the court feemed to adopt that idea, and recommended it, for the future practice of the bar.
