Opinion of the Court
ty's analysis followed neither Vonn nor Circuit precedent. 310 F.3d, at 1227–1228.
We granted certiorari, 540 U.S. 1072 (2003), on the question "[w]hether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred." Pet. for Cert. (I). We now reverse.
II
A
Because the Government agreed to make a nonbinding sentencing recommendation, Rule 11(c)(3)(B) required the court to "advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request." Rule 11, however, instructs that not every violation of its terms calls for reversal of conviction by entitling the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. "A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(h).[1]
In Vonn, we considered the standard that applies when a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error, and held that reversal is not in order unless the error is plain. 535 U.S., at 63; see Olano, supra, at 731–737. Although we explained that in assessing the effect of Rule 11 error, a reviewing court must look to the entire record, not to the plea proceedings alone, Vonn, supra, at 74–75, we did not formulate the standard for determining whether a defendant has shown, as the plain error standard requires, Olano, supra, at 734–735, an effect on his substantial rights.
- ↑ Congress gave the courts this instruction in 1983, in partial response to this Court's decision in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), which it felt had caused too many reversals for reasons that were too insubstantial. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66–71 (2002) (discussing the history of Rule 11(h)).
