Opinion of the Court
profession of guilt in open court, and are indispensable in the operation of the modern criminal justice system. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). And, in this case, these reasons are complemented by the fact, worth repeating, that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not of due process.
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding. Strickland, supra, at 694; Bagley, supra, at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J. (internal quotation marks omitted)).[1]
- ↑ One significant difference, however, between Rule 11 claims and claims under Strickland and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is that the latter may be raised in postconviction proceedings such as a petition for habeas corpus, or a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Those proceedings permit greater development of the record. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (Strickland claims are not procedurally defaulted when brought for the first time on § 2255, because of the advantages of that form of proceeding for hearing such cases). For Rule 11 claims, by contrast, that way is open only in the most egregious cases. Timmreck, supra; see also Vonn, 535 U.S., at 64 (noting that Rule 11(h) was not meant to disturb Timmreck). A defendant will rarely, if ever, be able to obtain relief for Rule 11 violations under § 2255; and relief on direct appeal, given the plain error standard that will apply in many cases, will be difficult to get, as it should be. Cf. United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 35, 45 (CA1 1994) (Boudin, J.) ("[J]ust as there are many fair trials but few perfect ones, so flaws are also to be expected in Rule 11 proceedings").
Our rule does not, however, foreclose relief altogether. The reasonable probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
