Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/253

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214
AETNA HEALTH INC. v. DAVILA

Opinion of the Court

362, 371 (1990) (state law tort action brought due to alleged negligence in the inspection of a mine was pre-empted, as the duty to inspect the mine arose solely out of the collective bargaining agreement).

Hence, respondents bring suit only to rectify a wrongful denial of benefits promised under ERISA regulated plans, and do not attempt to remedy any violation of a legal duty independent of ERISA. We hold that respondents' state causes of action fall "within the scope of" ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S., at 66, and are therefore completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502 and re movable to federal district court.[1]

B

The Court of Appeals came to a contrary conclusion for several reasons, all of them erroneous. First, the Court of Appeals found significant that respondents "assert a tort claim for tort damages" rather than "a contract claim for contract damages," and that respondents "are not seeking reimbursement for benefits denied them." 307 F.3d, at 309. But, distinguishing between pre-empted and non pre-empted claims based on the particular label affixed to them would "elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade" the pre-emptive scope of ERISA simply "by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract." Allis Chalmers, supra, at 211. Nor can the mere fact that the state cause of action attempts to authorize remedies beyond those authorized by ERISA § 502(a) put the cause


  1. Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress' clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (holding that "[e]ven if there were no express pre emption [under ERISA § 514(a)]" of the cause of action in that case, it "would be pre-empted because it conflict[ed] directly with an ERISA cause of action").