Opinion of Thomas, J.
fied by reference to the "Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence" or by any deterrence rationale, id., at 308; see Tucker, supra, at 446–449; Harris, supra, at 225–226, and n. 2, and would therefore fail our close fit requirement.
Furthermore, the Self Incrimination Clause contains its own exclusionary rule. It provides that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Amdt. 5. Unlike the Fourth Amendment's bar on unreasonable searches, the Self Incrimination Clause is self executing. We have repeatedly explained "that those subjected to coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection from the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial." Chavez, 538 U.S., at 769 (plurality opinion) (citing, for example, Elstad, supra, at 307–308). This explicit textual protection supports a strong presumption against expanding the Miranda rule any further. Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Finally, nothing in Dickerson, including its characterization of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule, 530 U.S., at 444, changes any of these observations. Indeed, in Dickerson, the Court specifically noted that the Court's "subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming [Miranda]'s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." Id., at 443–444. This description of Miranda, especially the emphasis on the use of "unwarned statements . . . in the prosecution's case in chief," makes clear our continued focus on the protections of the Self Incrimination Clause. The Court's reliance on our Miranda precedents, including both Tucker and Elstad, see, e. g., Dickerson, supra, at 438, 441, further demonstrates the continuing validity of those decisions. In short, nothing in Dickerson calls into question our continued
