Page:United States Reports, Volume 60.djvu/29

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DECEMBER TERM, 1856.
13

Ex Parte Secombe.


preme Court of the United States why a writ of mandamus should not be issued to compel the said judges so to do.

And the said motion will be made upon the petition of the said David A. Secombe, hereto annexed.

C. Cushing,
Attorney for Petitioner.

Dated May 30, 1856.

The case was by Mr. Badger in support of the motion.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court.

A mandamus has been moved for, by David A. Secombe, to be directed to the judges of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota, commanding them to vacate and set aside an order of the court, passed at January term, 1856, whereby the said Secombe was removed from his office as an attorney and counsellor of that court.

In the case of Tillinghast v. Conkling, which came before this court at January term, 1829, a similar motion was overruled by this court. The case is not reported; but a brief written opinion remains on the files of the court, in which the court says that the motion is overruled, upon the ground that it had not jurisdiction in the case.

The removal of the attorney and counsellor, in that case, took place in a District Court of the United States, exercising the powers of a Circuit Court; and, in a court of that character, the relations between the court and the attorneys and counsellors who practise in it, and their respective rights and duties, are regulated by the common law. And it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed. The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court, as the rights and dignity of the court itself.

It has, however, been urged at the bar, that a much broader discretionary power is exercised in courts acting upon the rules of the common law than can be lawfully exercised in the Territorial court of Minnesota; because the Legislature of the Territory has, by statute, prescribed the conditions upon which a person may entitle himself to admission as an attor-