502us1$$5Z 08-21-96 15:22:11 PAGES OPINPGT
Cite as: 502 U. S. 32 (1991)
43
Opinion of the Court
in the District Court.15 The Court rejected that argument, emphasizing the presumption that Congress normally intends the federal courts to enforce and protect the rights that Congress has created. Concluding that the Act did not bar the District Court’s jurisdiction, we stated: “This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers.” 358 U. S., at 190. In this litigation, the Court of Appeals interpreted our opinion in Kyne as authorizing judicial review of any agency action that is alleged to have exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. Kyne, however, differs from this litigation in two critical ways. First, central to our decision in Kyne was the fact that the Board’s interpretation of the Act would wholly deprive the union of a meaningful and adequate means of vindicating its statutory rights. “Here, differently from the Switchmen’s case, ‘absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts’ would mean ‘a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress’ has given professional employees, for there is no other means, within their control . . . to protect and enforce that right.” Ibid. The cases before us today are entirely different from Kyne because FISA expressly provides MCorp with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review of the validity of the source of strength regulation. If and when the Board 15 In Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S., at 306, the Court had reasoned: “When Congress in § 3 and in § 9 provided for judicial review of two types of orders or awards and in § 2 of the same Act omitted any such provision as respects a third type, it drew a plain line of distinction. And the inference is strong from the history of the Act that that distinction was not inadvertent. The language of the Act read in light of that history supports the view that Congress gave administrative action under § 2, Ninth a finality which it denied administrative action under the other sections of the Act.”
