502us1$12J 08-21-96 15:26:33 PAGES OPINPGT
Cite as: 502 U. S. 129 (1991)
145
Blackmun, J., dissenting
trative hearings remain outside the scope of this statute, those in which the Secretary is represented are covered by the Act” (footnote omitted; first emphasis in original; others supplied). H. R. Rep. No. 99–120, pp. 10–11 (1985). Thus, despite this Court’s demurral regarding whether Social Security proceedings are technically governed by § 554, and without expressing any view whatsoever on this issue, Congress nevertheless stated that EAJA fees were appropriate. This circumstance strongly indicates that Congress did not intend EAJA coverage to depend upon whether § 554, rather than some functionally equivalent provision, technically governs the proceeding. III As noted above, this Court recently held in Sullivan v. Hudson that the EAJA is to be “read in light of its purpose ‘to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action.’ ” 490 U. S., at 890. In particular, the Court held that while Social Security Administration proceedings on remand from federal district courts were not adversary adjudications, because the Government’s position was not represented by counsel or otherwise, id., at 891, they were nevertheless “part and parcel” of the civil action, and thus were covered by the “civil action” provisions of the EAJA. Id., at 888. In so holding, the Court rejected a plain meaning argument stronger than the one advanced here. The Government had argued that the term “civil action” unambiguously excluded administrative proceedings, and that the specific exclusion of Social Security provisions from administrative EAJA coverage precluded, by the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, their coverage under civil action
