546US1
Unit: $$U4
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Cite as: 546 U. S. 12 (2005)
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Per Curiam
Per Curiam. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) allows a district court to “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” But “[a]ny motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty, or within such further time as the court sets during the 7-day period.” Rule 33(b)(2). This deadline is rigid. The Rules provide that courts “may not extend the time to take any action under [Rule 33], except as stated” in Rule 33 itself. Rule 45(b)(2). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has construed Rule 33’s time limitations as “jurisdictional,” permitting the Government to raise non compliance with those limitations for the first time on appeal. 388 F. 3d 1043, 1049 (2004). However, there is “a critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdic tion and an inflexible claim-processing rule.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 456 (2004). Rule 33 is an example of the latter. We grant the petition for certiorari and the mo tion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit. I Petitioner Ivan Eberhart was convicted of one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine. On the last day available for post-trial motions, he moved for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. That motion raised a sin gle ground for relief—an alleged flaw in a transcript that had been published to the jury. Nearly six months later, petitioner filed a “supplemental memorandum” supporting his motion. Two additional grounds appeared in that fil ing—admission of potential hearsay testimony into evidence, and the District Court’s failure to give a so-called “buyer seller instruction” to the jury. 388 F. 3d, at 1047–1048. Rather than arguing, however, that the untimeliness of the supplemental memorandum barred the District Court from
