Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/244

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546US1

Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 21 (2005)

33

Opinion of the Court

Portal Act excludes this walking time from the scope of the FLSA. We find each of these arguments unpersuasive. Text IBP correctly points out that our decision in Steiner held only that the donning and doffing of protective gear in that case were activities “integral and indispensable” to the workers’ principal activity of making batteries. 350 U. S., at 256. In IBP’s view, a category of “integral and indispen­ sable” activities that may be compensable because they are not merely preliminary or postliminary within the meaning of § 4(a)(2) is not necessarily coextensive with the actual “principal activities” which the employee “is employed to perform” within the meaning of § 4(a)(1). In other words, IBP argues that, even though the court below concluded that donning and doffing of unique protective gear are “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ principal activity, this means only that the donning and doffing of such gear are themselves covered by the FLSA. According to IBP, the donning is not a “principal activity” that starts the workday, and the walking that occurs immediately after donning and immediately before doffing is not compensable. In effect, IBP asks us to create a third category of activities—those that are “integral and indispensable” to a “principal activity” and thus not excluded from coverage by § 4(a)(2), but that are not themselves “principal activities” as that term is de­ fined by § 4(a)(1). IBP’s submission is foreclosed by Steiner. As noted above, in Steiner we made it clear that § 4 of the Portal-toPortal Act does not remove activities which are “ ‘integral and indispensable’ ” to “ ‘principal activities’ ” from FLSA coverage precisely because such activities are themselves “ ‘principal activities.’ ” Id., at 253. While Steiner specifi­ cally addressed the proper interpretation of the term “prin­ cipal activity or activities” in § 4(a)(2), there is no plausible argument that these terms mean something different in