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SCHAFFER v. WEAST Opinion of the Court
we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief. B Petitioners contend first that a close reading of IDEA’s text compels a conclusion in their favor. They urge that we should interpret the statutory words “due process” in light of their constitutional meaning, and apply the balancing test established by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). Even assuming that the Act incorporates constitutional due process doctrine, Eldridge is no help to petitioners because “[o]utside the criminal law area, where special concerns at tend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally not an issue of federal constitutional moment.” Lavine v. Milne, 424 U. S. 577, 585 (1976). Petitioners next contend that we should take instruction from the lower court opinions of Mills v. Board of Educa tion, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), and Pennsylvania Associa tion for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971) (hereinafter PARC). IDEA’s drafters were admittedly guided “to a significant extent” by these two landmark cases. Rowley, 458 U. S., at 194. As the court below noted, however, the fact that Congress “took a number of the procedural safeguards from PARC and Mills and wrote them directly into the Act” does not allow us to “conclude . . . that Congress intended to adopt the ideas that it failed to write into the text of the statute.” 377 F. 3d, at 455. Petitioners also urge that putting the burden of persuasion on school districts will further IDEA’s purposes because it will help ensure that children receive a free appropriate pub lic education. In truth, however, very few cases will be in evidentiary equipoise. Assigning the burden of persuasion to school districts might encourage schools to put more re sources into preparing IEPs and presenting their evidence. But IDEA is silent about whether marginal dollars should
