Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/276

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546US1

Unit: $$U7

[09-04-08 12:12:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 49 (2005)

65

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

the IEP was appropriate. In reaching that result, we have sought to implement the intent of the statutory and regula­ tory schemes.”).1 Understandably, school districts striving to balance their budgets, if “[l]eft to [their] own devices,” will favor educa­ tional options that enable them to conserve resources. Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Ed., 392 F. 3d 840, 864–865 (CA6 2004). Saddled with a proof burden in administrative “due process” hearings, parents are likely to find a district­ proposed IEP “resistant to challenge.” 377 F. 3d, at 459 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Placing the burden on the district to show that its plan measures up to the statutorily man­ dated “free appropriate public education, ” 20 U. S. C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), will strengthen school officials’ resolve to choose a course genuinely tailored to the child’s individual needs.2 The Court acknowledges that “[a]ssigning the burden of persuasion to school districts might encourage schools to put more resources into preparing IEPs.” Ante, at 58. Curi­ ously, the Court next suggests that resources spent on devel­ oping IEPs rank as “administrative expenditures” not as ex­ penditures for “educational services.” Ante, at 59. Costs entailed in the preparation of suitable IEPs, however, are 1 The Court suggests that the IDEA’s stay-put provision, 20 U. S. C. § 1415( j), supports placement of the burden of persuasion on the parents. Ante, at 59–60. The stay-put provision, however, merely preserves the status quo. It would work to the advantage of the child and the parents when the school seeks to cut services offered under a previously estab­ lished IEP. True, Congress did not require that “a child be given the educational placement that a parent requested during a dispute.” Ibid. But neither did Congress require that the IEP advanced by the school district go into effect during the pendency of a dispute. 2 The Court observes that decisions placing “the entire burden of per­ suasion on the opposing party at the outset of a proceeding . . . are ex­ tremely rare.” Ante, at 57. In cases of this order, however, the persua­ sion burden is indivisible. It must be borne entirely by one side or the other: Either the school district must establish the adequacy of the IEP it has proposed or the parents must demonstrate the plan’s inadequacy.