546US1
Unit: $$U7
[09-04-08 12:12:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 49 (2005)
71
Breyer, J., dissenting
Most importantly, Congress has made clear that the Act itself represents an exercise in “cooperative federalism.” See ante, at 52–53 (opinion of the Court). Respecting the States’ right to decide this procedural matter here, where education is at issue, where expertise matters, and where costs are shared, is consistent with that cooperative ap proach. See Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473, 495 (2002) (when interpreting stat utes “designed to advance cooperative federalism[,] . . . we have not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices to the States”). Cf. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 275 (2000); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And judicial respect for such congressional determinations is important. Indeed, in today’s technologically and legally complex world, whether court decisions embody that kind of judicial respect may rep resent the true test of federalist principle. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 420 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Maryland has no special state law or regulation setting forth a special IEP-related burden of persuasion standard. But it does have rules of state administrative procedure and a body of state administrative law. The state ALJ should determine how those rules, or other state law, applies to this case. Cf., e. g., Ind. Admin. Code, tit. 511, Rule 7–30–3 (2003) (hearings under the Act conducted in accord with gen eral state administrative law); 7 Ky. Admin. Regs., tit. 707, ch. 1:340, Section 7(4) (same). Because the state ALJ did not do this (i. e., he looked for a federal, not a state, burden of persuasion rule), I would remand this case.
