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[08-22-08 14:08:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN
BRADSHAW v. RICHEY Per Curiam
See Richey v. Mitchell, 395 F. 3d 660, 675 (2005). The Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of that section, as announced in its review of respondent’s case, directly contradicts the Sixth Circuit’s analysis: “The fact that the intended victims escaped harm, and that an innocent child, Cynthia Collins, was killed in stead, does not alter Richey’s legal and moral responsi bility. ‘The doctrine of transferred intent is firmly rooted in Ohio law.’ Very simply, ‘the culpability of a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill is not altered by the fact that the scheme is directed at someone other than the actual victim.’ ” State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St. 3d 353, 364, 595 N. E. 2d 915, 925 (1992) (citations omitted). This statement was dictum, since the only sufficiency-of evidence claim raised by respondent pertained to his setting of the fire. Nonetheless, its explanation of Ohio law was perfectly clear and unambiguous. We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 67–68 (1991); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691 (1975). The Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion should not be read to endorse transferred intent in respondent’s case because such a construction would likely constitute “an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expan sion of narrow and precise statutory language,” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 352 (1964), in violation of the Due Process Clause. 395 F. 3d, at 677 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259 (1997); Bouie, 378 U. S., at 351). It is doubtful whether this principle of fair notice has any application to a case of transferred intent, where the defendant’s contemplated conduct was exactly what the rel
