546US1
82
Unit: $U10
[09-04-08 12:14:58] PAGES PGT: OPIN
LINCOLN PROPERTY CO. v. ROCHE Syllabus
(a) The Fourth Circuit correctly identified Lincoln as a proper party, but erred in insisting that some other entity affiliated with Lincoln should have been joined as a codefendant, and that it was Lincoln’s obli gation to name that entity and show that its joinder would not destroy diversity. This Court stresses, first, that the existence of complete di versity between the Roches and Lincoln is plain and no longer subject to debate. The Court turns next to the reasons why the Fourth Circuit erred in determining that diversity jurisdiction was not proved by the removing parties. Since Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, this Court has read the statutory formulation “between . . . citizens of differ ent States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1), to require complete diversity be tween all plaintiffs and all defendants. While § 1332 allows plaintiffs to invoke diversity jurisdiction, § 1441 gives defendants a corresponding opportunity. The scales are not evenly balanced, however. An in-state plaintiff may invoke diversity jurisdiction, but § 1441(b) bars removal on the basis of diversity if any “part[y] in interest properly joined and served as [a] defendan[t] is a citizen of the State in which [the] action is brought.” In this case, Virginia plaintiffs joined and served no Virgin ian as a party defendant. Hence, the action qualified for the removal defendants effected. Neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), captioned “Real Party in Interest,” nor Rule 19, captioned “Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication,” requires plaintiffs or defendants to name and join any additional parties to this action. Both Rules ad dress party joinder, not federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit and the Roches draw from this Court’s decisions a juris dictional “real parties to the controversy” rule applicable in diversity cases to complaining and defending parties alike. But the Court is aware of no decision supporting the burden the Fourth Circuit placed on a properly joined defendant to negate the existence of a potential codefendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity. Pp. 88–91. (b) This Court’s decisions employing “real party to the controversy” terminology bear scant resemblance to the Roches’ action. No party here has been “improperly or collusively” named solely to create federal jurisdiction, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1359, Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U. S. 823, 830. Nor are cases in which actions against a state agency have been regarded as suits against the State itself, see State Highway Comm’n of Wyo. v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U. S. 194, 199–200, relevant to suits between private parties. Unlike cases in which a party was named to satisfy state pleading rules, e. g., McNutt ex rel. Leggett, Smith, & Lawrence v. Bland, 2 How. 9, 14, or was joined only as designated performer of a ministerial act, e. g., Walden v. Skinner, 101 U. S. 577, 589, or otherwise had no control of, impact, or stake in
