546US1
Unit: $U12
[08-22-08 15:26:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 132 (2005)
141
Opinion of the Court
In light of these “ ‘large objectives,’ ” Zipes, supra, at 759, the standard for awarding fees should turn on the reason ableness of the removal. Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively rea sonable basis exists, fees should be denied. See, e. g., Horn buckle, 385 F. 3d, at 541; Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F. 3d 290, 293 (CA5 2000). In applying this rule, district courts retain discretion to consider whether unusual circum stances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case. For instance, a plaintiff ’s delay in seeking remand or failure to disclose facts necessary to determine jurisdiction may af fect the decision to award attorney’s fees. When a court exercises its discretion in this manner, however, its reasons for departing from the general rule should be “faithful to the purposes” of awarding fees under § 1447(c). Fogerty, 510 U. S., at 534, n. 19; see also Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Na tional Gypsum Co., 515 U. S. 189, 196, n. 8 (1995) (“[A]s is always the case when an issue is committed to judicial discre tion, the judge’s decision must be supported by a circum stance that has relevance to the issue at hand”).
The District Court denied the Martins’ request for attor ney’s fees because Franklin had an objectively reasonable basis for removing this case to federal court. The Court of Appeals considered it a “close question,” 393 F. 3d, at 1148, but agreed that the grounds for removal were reasonable. Because the Martins do not dispute the reasonableness of Franklin’s removal arguments, we need not review the lower courts’ decision on this point. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered.
