546US1
Unit: $U15
[08-22-08 15:43:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)
179
Opinion of the Court
not affected by differential pricing; a dealer in the competi tive bidding process here at issue approaches Volvo for a price concession only after it has been selected by a retail customer to submit a bid. Competition for an opportunity to bid, we earlier observed, is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputa tion. See supra, at 170.3 We reiterate in this regard an observation made by Judge Hansen, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit’s Robinson-Patman holding: Once a retail cus tomer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, “the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate sale.” 374 F. 3d, at 719. That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in the same geographic area does not import that they in fact com peted for the same customer-tailored sales. In sum, the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder’s “compet itors,” hence those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, 460 U. S., at 435 (inference of competitive injury under Morton Salt arises from “proof of a substantial price discrimination be tween competing purchasers over time” (emphasis added)). B Reeder did offer evidence of two instances in which it com peted head to head with another Volvo dealer. See supra, at 171–172. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier’s product to fulfill its 3
A dealer’s reputation for securing favorable concessions, we recognize, may influence the customer’s bidding invitations. Cf. post, at 183, n. 2. We do not pursue that point here, however, because Reeder did not present—or even look for—evidence that Volvo consistently disfavored Reeder while it consistently favored certain other dealers. See supra, at 172–173.
