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Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)
181
Opinion of the Court
main concern. Even if the Act’s text could be construed in the manner urged by Reeder and embraced by the Court of Appeals, we would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition.4 In the case before us, there is no evidence that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the al legedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resem blance to large independent department stores or chain oper ations, and the supplier’s selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands. See id., at 51–52 (observing that the market impact of a vertical prac tice, such as a change in a supplier’s distribution system, may be a “simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition”). By declining to ex tend Robinson-Patman’s governance to such cases, we con tinue to construe the Act “consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.” Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 220 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, n. 13 (1979)); see Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63 (1953) (cautioning against RobinsonPatman constructions that “extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help give rise to a price uniform ity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation”).5 4 The dissent assails Volvo’s decision to reduce the number of its dealers. Post, at 183. But Robinson-Patman does not bar a manufacturer from restructuring its distribution networks to improve the efficiency of its op erations. If Volvo did not honor its obligations to Reeder as its fran chisee, “[a]ny remedy . . . lies in state laws addressing unfair competition and the rights of franchisees, not in the Robinson-Patman Act.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. 5 See also Hovenkamp ¶ 2333c, p. 109 (commenting that the Eighth Cir cuit’s expansive interpretation “views the [Robinson-Patman Act] as a guarantee of equal profit margins on sales actually made,” and thereby exposes manufacturers to treble damages unless they “charge uniform prices to their dealers”).
