546US1
Unit: $U15
[08-22-08 15:43:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)
185
Stevens, J., dissenting
II For decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the Robinson-Patman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948): “It is argued that the findings fail to show that respond ent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s discounts, al though the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. The statute re quires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations ‘may be substantially to lessen competition . . . or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi tion.’ After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that ‘the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a rea sonable possibility that they “may” have such an effect.’ Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found what would ap pear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate.” Id., at 45–47 (footnote omitted). We have treated as competitors those who sell “in a single, interstate retail market.” Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 436 (1983); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320, 327 (1961). Under this approach—uncontroversial until today—Reeder
