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EVANS v. CHAVIS Syllabus
the court’s decision as equivalent to an order in which the words “on the merits” appeared. If the appearance of “on the merits” does not automatically warrant a holding that the filing was timely, the absence of those words could not automatically warrant such a holding. Absent (1) clear direction or explanation from the California Supreme Court about the meaning of “reasonable time” in the present context, or (2) clear indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely, the Ninth Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in re spect to timeliness. This is what this Court believes it asked the Cir cuit to do in Saffold. This is what this Court believes the Circuit should have done here. Pp. 197–198. (b) Given the uncertain scope of California’s “reasonable time” stand ard, it may not be easy for the Ninth Circuit to decide in each of the several hundred federal habeas petitions from California prisoners it hears annually whether a prisoner’s state-court review petition was timely. However, for the reasons given in Saffold, the Circuit’s attempt to create shortcuts looking to the label the California Supreme Court applied to the denial order, even where that label does not refer to time liness, are not true, either to California’s timeliness rule or to AEDPA’s intent to toll the 1-year limitations period only when the state collateral review proceeding is “pending.” Saffold, 536 U. S., at 220–221, 225– 226. The California courts might alleviate the problem by clarifying the scope of “reasonable time” or by indicating, when denying a petition, whether the filing was timely. And the Ninth Circuit might seek guid ance by certifying a question to the State Supreme Court in an appro priate case. Id., at 226–227. Alternatively, the California Legislature might decide to impose more determinate time limits, conforming Cali fornia law with that of most other States. Absent any such guidance from state law, however, the Ninth Circuit’s only alternative is to simply ask and decide whether the state prisoner’s filing was made within a reasonable time. In doing so, the Circuit must be mindful that, in Saf fold, this Court held that timely filings in California fell within the fed eral tolling provision on the assumption that California’s “reasonable time” standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those in States with determinate timeliness rules. Id., at 222–223. Pp. 198–200. (c) Chavis did not file his petition for review in the California Su preme Court within a reasonable time. This Court’s examination of the record refutes his claim that his 3-year, 1-month, delay was reasonable because he could not use the prison library to work on his petition dur ing this period. And since Chavis needs all but two days of that
