546US1
Unit: $U16
[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 189 (2006)
197
Opinion of the Court
III
A
California argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is inconsistent with our decision in Saffold. Like Cali fornia, we do not see how it is possible to reconcile the two cases. In Saffold, we held that (1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period for the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the filing of a notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, “unreasonable” delays are not timely; and (3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition “on the merits” does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely filed. In addition, we referred to a Ninth Circuit case holding that a 4-year delay was reasonable as an example of what the law forbids the Ninth Circuit to do. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in this case said in effect that the California Supreme Court’s denial of a petition “on the merits” did automatically mean that the petition was timely (and thus that a 3-year delay was reasonable). More than that, it treated an order from the California Supreme Court that was silent on the grounds for the court’s decision as if it were equivalent to an order in which the words “on the merits” appeared. 382 F. 3d, at 926. If the appearance of the words “on the merits” does not automatically warrant a holding that the filing was timely, the absence of those words could not automatically warrant a holding that the fil ing was timely. After all, the fact that the California Su preme Court did not include the words “on the merits” in its order denying Chavis relief makes it less likely, not more likely, that the California Supreme Court believed that Chavis’ 3-year delay was reasonable. Thus, the Ninth Cir cuit’s presumption (“that an order decided entirely on the merits indicates that the state court did not find the petition
