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EVANS v. CHAVIS Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment. Today the Court holds that, in the absence of a clear state ment by a California state court that a petition for habeas corpus was timely or untimely, a federal court “must itself examine the delay in each case” to determine whether the filing “was made within what California would consider a ‘reasonable time.’ ” Ante, at 198. Contrary to the Court’s admonition in its next sentence, this is not what we “asked the Circuit to do in Saffold,” and it is not what “it should have done.” Ibid. (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214 (2002)). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case was both faithful to our decision in Saffold and consistent with our prior juris prudence. Instead of endorsing an ad hoc approach to the interpretation of ambiguous judgments entered by Califor nia courts in the future, I believe we should direct the Ninth Circuit to apply the straightforward presumptions that I de scribe below. Rather than a de novo review of the record and California law, see ante, at 200–201, it is the application of these presumptions, buttressed by an independent error made by the Ninth Circuit, that convinces me that the judg ment must be reversed. I As the Court has explained, both in Saffold and in its opin ion today, California’s postconviction procedures are unlike those employed by most other States. See 536 U. S., at 221– 222; ante, at 191–193. California’s time limit for the filing of a habeas corpus petition in a noncapital case is more forgiv ing and more flexible than that employed by most States. See Saffold, 536 U. S., at 222. Generally, such a petition “must be filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim.” In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 828, n. 7, 855 P. 2d 391, 398, n. 7 (1993). And the State Supreme Court appar ently may exercise its jurisdiction to decide the merits of a petition for habeas corpus at any time whatsoever. See
