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EVANS v. CHAVIS Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
decisive state-law requirement is at issue, application of AEDPA’s tolling provision is analogous to the question whether denial of a state postconviction petition rested upon an adequate and independent state ground. Faced with such a question, it has been our general prac tice to try to determine the actual basis for the state court’s decision rather than to resolve the state-law issue ourselves. The mere fact that a federal petitioner failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not prevent a federal court from resolving a federal claim unless the state court actually re lied on the state procedural bar “as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 261–262 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). This practice is consistent with the rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1042 (1983), that unless it is “clear from the opin ion itself ” that the state court’s decision rested on an ade quate and independent state ground, we have appellate juris diction to review its resolution of a federal constitutional question. And in cases in which a state-court order is silent as to the basis for its decision, we have resorted to a pre sumption to reflect the role intended for such orders by the state court that issued it. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U. S. 797, 803–804 (1991). Until today, however, we have not directed the lower fed eral courts to decide disputed issues of state procedural law for themselves instead of focusing on the actual basis for a state-court ruling. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case was entirely consistent with our past practice, and I would adhere to that practice in confronting the question whether habeas petitions advancing federal claims in California courts were filed within a reasonable time as a matter of California law. Cf. Brooks v. Walls, 279 F. 3d 518, 522 (CA7 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying Harris and Ylst to AEDPA’s “properly filed” requirement). The inquiry, then, should focus on what the state court actually decided rather
