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BROWN v. SANDERS Opinion of the Court
in aggravation under a different rubric. We therefore set forth different rules governing the consequences of an invali dated eligibility factor in a non-weighing State.3 The sen 3
Justice Breyer contends that harmless-error review applies in both weighing and non-weighing States. See post, at 235–239 (dissenting opin ion). It would be strange indeed to discover at this late stage that our long-held distinction between the two sorts of States for purposes of re viewing invalid eligibility factors in fact made no difference. Cf., e. g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 232 (1992) (weighing/non-weighing distinc tion is “of critical importance”). Not surprisingly, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly understood that different rules apply to weighing and non-weighing States, and that harmless-error review is necessary only in the former. See, e. g., Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F. 3d 1054, 1059–1060 (CA9 2004); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F. 3d 736, 746–749 (CA3 1995); Wil liams v. Cain, 125 F. 3d 269, 281 (CA5 1997). Our own cases, moreover, are flatly inconsistent with requiring harmless-error review in both types of States. As Justice Breyer notes, post, at 235, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983), did endorse the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding that attaching the statutory label “aggravating” to the invalid eligibility factor had an “inconsequential im pact on the jury’s decision regarding the death penalty,” id., at 889 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). But the core holding is what we said next: “More importantly, . . . any possible impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process.” Ibid. (emphasis added); see also post, at 237–239. Zant must therefore be read not as holding that any constitutional error was harmless, but as rejecting re spondent’s claim of constitutional error. Neither Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), nor Stringer says anything to the contrary. Justice Breyer points out that Clemons’ harmless-error discussion focused on the emphasis given to the invalid factor, rather than on the fact that Mississippi is a weighing State, but that is hardly relevant: Our discussion of how harmless-error analysis should be conducted (the issue in the passage from Clemons that Justice Breyer cites, 494 U. S., at 753–754) says nothing about when that analysis should be conducted (the issue addressed by the weighing/non-weighing distinc tion). On the latter question, Clemons maintains the distinction envi sioned in Zant, see 462 U. S., at 890–891, between Georgia (a non-weighing State) and Mississippi (a weighing State), see Clemons, supra, at 745. Likewise, Stringer specifically distinguishes between non-weighing States, in which “the fact that [the jury] also finds an invalid aggravating
