546US1
Unit: $U17
[08-22-08 15:50:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 212 (2006)
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Stevens, J., dissenting
We agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court that any such impact was “ ‘inconsequential,’ ” id., at 889, and held that it “cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process,” ibid. The same is true here.
Because the jury’s consideration of the invalid “special cir cumstances” gave rise to no constitutional violation, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering habeas relief. The judg ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting. Our prior cases have drawn a simple categorical distinc tion between a nonweighing State and a weighing State. In the former, the sole function of an aggravating circumstance finding is to make the defendant eligible for the death pen alty. See, e. g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 874 (1983) (“[I]n Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion [to impose the death penalty], apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty”). In the latter, such a finding performs a second function—it provides a reason for deciding to impose that sentence on an eligible defendant. See, e. g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990) (“In Mississippi, unlike the Georgia scheme consid ered in Zant, the finding of aggravating factors is part of the jury’s sentencing determination, and the jury is required to weigh any mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances”). Thus, in a nonweighing State, the finding of four aggravat ing circumstances has the same legal significance as a finding
