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GONZALES v. OREGON Syllabus
some terminally ill state residents challenged the Rule. The District Court permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Ninth Circuit invali dated the Rule, reasoning that, by making a medical procedure author ized under Oregon law a federal offense, it altered the balance between the States and the Federal Government without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized the action; and in the alternative, that the Rule could not be squared with the CSA’s plain language, which targets only conventional drug abuse and excludes the Attorney General from medical policy decisions. Held: The CSA does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under state law permitting the procedure. Pp. 255–275. (a) An administrative rule interpreting the issuing agency’s own am biguous regulation may receive substantial deference. Auer v. Rob bins, 519 U. S. 452, 461–463. So may an interpretation of an ambiguous statute, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–845, but only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226–227. Otherwise, the interpretation is “entitled to respect” only to the extent it has the “power to persuade.” Skid more v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Pp. 255–256. (b) The Interpretive Rule at issue is not entitled to Auer deference as an interpretation of 21 CFR § 1306.04. Unlike the underlying regu lations in Auer, which gave specificity to a statutory scheme the Sec retary of Labor was charged with enforcing and reflected the Labor Department’s considerable experience and expertise, the underlying regulation here does little more than restate the terms of the statute itself. The CSA allows prescription of drugs that have a “currently accepted medical use,” 21 U. S. C. § 812(b); requires a “medical purpose” for dispensing the least controlled substances of those on the schedules, § 829(c); and defines a “valid prescription” as one “issued for a legitimate medical purpose,” § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii). Similarly, physicians are consid ered practitioners if they dispense controlled substances “in the course of professional practice.” 21 U. S. C. § 802(21). The regulation just re peats two of these statutory phrases and attempts to summarize the others. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formu late a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory lan guage. Furthermore, any statutory authority for the Interpretive Rule would have to come from 1984 CSA amendments adding the “public
