Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 108 Part 4.djvu/250

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108 STAT. 2884 PUBLIC LAW 103-337 —OCT. 5, 1994 (1) not more than $60,000,000 may be obligated for the demilitarization of defense industries and the conversion of mihtary technologies and capabilities into civilian activities; (2) not more than $200,000,000 may be obligated for Weapons Dismantlement, Destruction, and Denuclearization; (3) not more than $60,000,000 may be obligated for Safety and Security, Transportation, and Storage; (4) not more than $40,000,000 may be obligated for Nonproliferation; (5) not more than $20,000,000 may be obligated for Defense and Military-to-Military Contacts; and (6) not more than $20,000,000 may be obligated for other authorized programs and activities. (b) LIMITED AUTHORITY To EXCEED INDIVIDUAL LIMITATION AMOUNTS. —(1) If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the national interest, the Secretary may, subject to paragraph (2), obligate amounts for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs of subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified for those purposes in that paragraph. However, the total gmaount obligated for the purposes stated in the paragraphs in subsection (a) may not by reason of the use of the authority provided in the preceding sentence exceed the sum of the amounts specified in those paragraphs. (2) An obligation for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified in that paragraph may be made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) only after— (A) the Secretary submits to Congress a notification of the intent to do so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doing so; and (B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notification. SEC. 1207. REPORT ON OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM OF THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. (a) FINDINGS. —Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States has identified nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a high priority in the conduct of United States national security policy. (2) The United States is seeking universal adherence to global regimes that control nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and is promoting new measures that provide increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. (3) In early 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin indicated to former United States President George Bush that Russia still had an offensive biological weapons program. (4) A United States Government report dated January 19, 1993, on arms control noncompliance noted that Russian declarations up to that date had dramatically underestimated the size, scope, and maturity of the former Soviet biological weapons program. (5) Despite President Yeltsin's decree of April 11, 1993, stating that activities in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention are illegal, questions continue to arise regarding