Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 108 Part 4.djvu/272

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108 STAT. 2906 PUBLIC LAW 103-337—OCT. 5, 1994 international inspection of its nuclear facilities that is required of all signatories of that Treaty. (7) North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs represent a grave threat to the security of the Korean peninsula and the entire world. (8) Efforts in recent years by the United States to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula have included— (A) the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the territory of the Republic of Korea and a reduction in the number of United States military personnel stationed there; (B) the postponement of the 1994 Team Spirit exercises; (C) the establishment of direct diplomatic contacts with the North Korean government; and (D) the offer of expanded diplomatic and economic contacts with North Korea. (9) Weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal reactor at Yongbyon. (10) International inspectors were not permitted to examine and test in a timely manner spent fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, as required to ensure compliance with North Korea's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (11) Diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear program has clearly reached a crucial stage, the unsatisfactory resolution of which would place the international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy and threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the Northeast Asia region, and, by extension, the rest of the world. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the announced freeze on the North Korean nuclear program should remain in place until internationaly agreedupon safeguards of any North Korean civilian nuclear program can be made fully effective; (2) the North Korean government should take a further step toward verified cooperation with the international nonproliferation regime by— (A) permitting the unfettered international inspection and testing of the spent fuel rods removed from North Korea's nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, followed by adequate international supervision of the transfer of all spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon complex and their disposal in another country; and (B) accepting a comprehensive inspection process as required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (3) a resolution of the inspection controversy at the Yongbyon complex that allows for anything less than the full international inspection of facilities in that complex required by North Korea's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty— (A) would be unsatisfactory; and (B) should prompt the Government of the United States to take such action as would indicate the severity with which the United States views this provocation against international norms; and