Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 115 Part 1.djvu/318

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115 STAT. 296 PUBLIC LAW 107-56 —OCT. 26, 2001 International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti- Terrorism Act of 2001. 31 USC 5301 note. 31 USC 5311 note. "(h) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with a court order or request for emergency assistance under this Act.". TITLE III^INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI- TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 2001 SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the "International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001". SEC. 302. FINDINGS AND PtHElPOSES. (a) FINDINGS. — The Congress finds that— (1) money laundering, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to amount to between 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, which is at least $600,000,000,000 annually, provides the financial fuel that permits transnational criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the detriment of the safety and security of American citizens; (2) money laundering, and the defects in financial transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to the financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist attacks; (3) money launderers subvert legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and terrorism, and, by so doing, can threaten the safety of United States citizens and undermine the integrity of United States financial institutions and of the global financial and trading systems upon which prosperity and growth depend; (4) certain jurisdictions outside of the United States that offer "offshore" banking and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used to commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial frauds that prey on law-abiding citizens; (5) transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow the trail of money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises, and global terrorist organizations; (6) correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking mechanisms susceptible in some circumstances to manipulation by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the identity of real parties in interest to financial transactions; (7) private banking services can be susceptible to manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign government officials, particularly if those services include the creation of offshore accounts and facilities for large personal funds transfers to channel funds into accounts around the globe;