PUBLIC LAW 107-108—DEC. 28, 2001 115 STAT. 1403 (1) in section 207(b)(1) (115 Stat. 282), by striking 50 USC 1805. "105(d)(2)" and "1805(d)(2)" and inserting "105(e)(2)" and "1805(e)(2)", respectively; and (2) in section 1003 (115 Stat. 392), by inserting "of 1978" 50 USC 1801. after "Act". TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS OF CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM. (a) ANNUAL AUDITS. — Subsection (g)(1) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended— (1) by striking "December 31" and inserting "January 31"; and (2) by striking "conduct" and inserting "complete". (b) PERMANENT AUTHORITY.—Subsection (h) of that section is amended— (1) by striking paragraph (1); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively; (3) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking "paragraph (3)" and inserting "paragraph (2)"; and (4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking "paragraph (2)" and inserting "paragraph (1)". SEC. 402. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT. Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (f), by striking "September 30, 2002" and inserting "September 30, 2003"; and (2) in subsection (i), by striking "or 2002" and inserting "2002, or 2003". SEC. 403. GUIDELINES FOR RECRUITMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN ASSETS. Recognizing dissatisfaction with the provisions of the guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency (promulgated in 1995) for handling cases involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns and recognizing that, although there have been recent modifications to those guidelines, they do not fully address the challenges of both existing and long-term threats to United States security, the Director of Central Intelligence shall— (1) rescind the existing guidelines for handling such cases; (2) issue new guidelines that more appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to ensure that qualified field intelligence officers can, and should, swiftly and directly gather intelligence from human sources in such a fashion as to ensure the ability to provide timely information that would allow for indications and warnings of plans and intentions of hostile actions or events; and (3) ensure that such information is shared in a broad and expeditious fashion so that, to the extent possible, actions to protect American lives and interests can be taken.
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