Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 116 Part 1.djvu/817

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PUBLIC LAW 107-204—JULY 30, 2002 116 STAT. 791 (4) emerging companies with disparities in price to earning ratios; (5) issuers whose operations significantly affect any material sector of the economy; and (6) any other factors that the Commission may consider relevant. (c) MINIMUM REVIEW PERIOD. —In no event shall an issuer required to file reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be reviewed under this section less frequently than once every 3 years. SEC. 409. REAL TIME ISSUER DISCLOSURES. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: "(1) REAL TIME ISSUER DISCLOSURES. —Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or usefiil for the protection of investors and in the public interest.". TITLE V—ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SEC. 501. TREATMENT OF SECURITIES ANALYSTS BY REGISTERED SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGES. (a) RULES REGARDING SECURITIES ANALYSTS.— The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15C the following new section: "SEC. 15D. SECURITIES ANALYSTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS. 15 USC 78o-6. "(a) ANALYST PROTECTIONS. —The Commission, or upon the Deadline, authorization and direction of the Commission, a registered securities association or national securities exchange, shall have adopted, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, rules reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in research reports and public appearances, in order to improve the objectivity of research and provide investors with more useful and reliable information, including rules designed— "(1) to foster greater public confidence in securities research, and to protect the objectivity and independence of securities analysts, by— "(A) restricting the prepublication clearance or approval of research reports by persons employed by the broker or dealer who are engaged in investment banking activities, or persons not directly responsible for investment research, other than legal or compliance staff; "(B) limiting the supervision and compensatory evaluation of securities analysts to officials employed by the broker or dealer who are not engaged in investment banking activities; and