Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 117.djvu/1221

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[117 STAT. 1202]
PUBLIC LAW 107-000—MMMM. DD, 2003
[117 STAT. 1202]

117 STAT. 1202

PUBLIC LAW 108–105—NOV. 5, 2003 (4) In reaching this conclusion, the Court deferred to the Federal district court’s factual findings that the partial-birth abortion procedure was statistically and medically as safe as, and in many circumstances safer than, alternative abortion procedures. (5) However, substantial evidence presented at the Stenberg trial and overwhelming evidence presented and compiled at extensive congressional hearings, much of which was compiled after the district court hearing in Stenberg, and thus not included in the Stenberg trial record, demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman upon whom the procedure is performed and is outside the standard of medical care. (6) Despite the dearth of evidence in the Stenberg trial court record supporting the district court’s findings, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court refused to set aside the district court’s factual findings because, under the applicable standard of appellate review, they were not ‘‘clearly erroneous’’. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous ‘‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed’’. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Under this standard, ‘‘if the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently’’. Id. at 574. (7) Thus, in Stenberg, the United States Supreme Court was required to accept the very questionable findings issued by the district court judge—the effect of which was to render null and void the reasoned factual findings and policy determinations of the United States Congress and at least 27 State legislatures. (8) However, under well-settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, the United States Congress is not bound to accept the same factual findings that the Supreme Court was bound to accept in Stenberg under the ‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard. Rather, the United States Congress is entitled to reach its own factual findings—findings that the Supreme Court accords great deference—and to enact legislation based upon these findings so long as it seeks to pursue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of the Constitution, and draws reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence. (9) In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Supreme Court articulated its highly deferential review of congressional factual findings when it addressed the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Regarding Congress’ factual determination that section 4(e) would assist the Puerto Rican community in ‘‘gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services,’’ the Court stated that ‘‘[i]t was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations * * *. It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict

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