124 STAT. 2842 PUBLIC LAW 111–267—OCT. 11, 2010 (2) The James Webb Space Telescope has exceeded its cost estimate. (3) In 2007 the Government Accountability Office issued a report on NASA’s high risk acquisition performance. (4) In response, NASA prepared a corrective action plan two years ago. (b) REPORTS.— (1) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 30 of each year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the implementation during the preceding year for the corrective action plan referred to in subsection (a)(4). (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report under this subsection shall set forth, for the year covered by such report, the following: (A) A description of each NASA program that has exceeded its cost baseline by 15 percent or more or is more than 2 years behind its projected development schedule. (B) For each program specified under subparagraph (A), a plan for such decrease in scope or requirements, or other measures, to be undertaken to control cost and schedule, including any cost monitoring or corrective actions undertaken pursuant to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–155), and the amendments made by that Act. SEC. 1204. ELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICE OF INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY SERVING AS ADMINISTRATOR OF NASA. The individual serving in the position of Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as of the date of the enactment of this Act comes from civilian life and is therefore eligible to serve in such position, in conformance with section 202 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2472(a)). SEC. 1205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF NASA SOFTWARE. It is the sense of Congress that— (1) safety is at the heart of every NASA mission; (2) the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance remains vital to assuring the safety of all NASA activities; (3) among the most important activities of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance is the performance of inde- pendent safety and mission assurance assessments and process verification reviews; (4) as NASA embarks on a new path, independent verification and validation of software must be of the highest priority to ensure safety throughout all NASA programs; (5) NASA’s activities depend on software integrity to achieve their goals and deliver a successful mission to the American people; (6) independent verification and validation is necessary to ensure that safety-critical software will operate dependably and support mission success; (7) the creation of the Independent Verification and Valida- tion Facility of NASA was the direct result of recommendations made by the National Research Council and the Report of 42 USC 18443.
