124 STAT. 32 PUBLIC LAW 111–140—FEB. 16, 2010 atmospheric samples—often the preferred method of sample acquisition—has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued. (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characteriza- tion of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States National Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program. (5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities con- taining such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by national security concerns. (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary to have the capability to positively identify the source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware of that capability. Inter- national cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological material. SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should— (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international agree- ments to establish, or seek to establish under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an inter- national framework for determining the source of any con- fiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon, as well as the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or radiological material used in such a weapon; (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and dissemina- tion of sensitive information relating to nuclear or radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent required by the agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and (3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly iden- tify the source of a nuclear detonation. SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE. (a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of the Home- land Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by Public Law 110– 53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semi- colon;
