PUBLIC LAW 98-525—OCT. 19, 1984
98 STAT. 2587
nental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with air launched cruise missiles, and other related limits in existing strategic offensive arms agreements, (b) In view of these findings, it is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of concerns over compliance with existing strategic and other arms control agreements and should seek corrective actions, where appropriate, through the Standing Consultative Commission and other available diplomatic channels; (2) the United States should, through December 31, 1985, continue to pursue its stated policy to refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union refrains from undercutting the provisions of those agreements, or until a new strategic offensive arms agreement is concluded; (3) the President should provide a report to the Congress in both classified and unclassified forms reflecting additional findings regarding Soviet adherence to such a no-undercut policy, by February 15, 1985; (4) the President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985, a report that— (A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy on strategic arms and United States security interests more generally; (B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy; (C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and (D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy; and (5) the President should carefully consider the impact of any change to this current policy regarding existing strategic offensive arms agreements on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies and should consult with the Congress before making any change in current policy.
President of U.S: Report. Confidentiality. President of U.S. Report.
POLICY ON THE STATUS OF CERTAIN TREATIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TESTING
SEC. 1111. (a) The Senate makes the following findings: (1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. (2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United StatesSoviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976, and
14 UST 1313. 21 UST 483.