Jackson, J., dissenting
readily susceptible to the majority’s narrowing construction.
III
The majority nevertheless revises the statute, leaning on the canon of constitutional avoidance. Ante, at 16–17.[1] But that canon “comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not give the Court license “to rewrite a statute as it pleases.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). And, here, for the reasons explained above, it is clear that the majority has mounted “a serious invasion of the legislative domain.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority’s rescue mission is especially problematic because it is taking place in the context of a First Amendment challenge to a statute on overbreadth grounds, as explained below.
A
Overbreadth challenges are an “exception to the usual rules governing standing,” a variation the Court has long permitted in recognition of the “danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.” Dombrowski, 380 U. S., at 486–487 (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent overbreadth doctrine, “the contours of regulation[s]” that impinge on the freedom of speech “would have to be hammered out case by case—and
- ↑ The majority implies that constitutional avoidance is a backup argument. Ante, at 16 (suggesting that its reading of the statute is the “best one”). But, in my view, the text and history of the encouragement provision make it hard to get even close to the majority’s narrow reading without substantial reliance on the constitutional-avoidance principle.
