likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560–61 (alteration, ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). [1] “In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
The district court held that Plaintiffs had standing to bring their Title IX retaliation claim, but gave few reasons for its decision. See Ollier, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. On appeal, Sweetwater argues, as it did before the district court, that Plaintiffs lack standing to enjoin the retaliatory action allegedly taken against Coach Martinez because students may not “recover for adverse retaliatory employment actions taken against” an educator, even if that educator “engaged in protected activity on behalf of the students.” Sweetwater contends that while Coach Martinez would have had standing to bring a Title IX retaliation claim himself, the “third party” students cannot “maintain a valid cause of action for retaliation under Title IX for their coach’s protected activity and the adverse employment action taken against the coach.”
We reject this argument. It misunderstands Plaintiffs’ claim, which asserts that Sweetwater impermissibly retaliated against them by firing Coach Martinez in response to Title IX
- ↑ Sweetwater does not contest that Plaintiffs’ alleged harm is “fairly traceable” to them. Sweetwater’s argument against redressability is premised on the idea that prospective injunctive relief cannot redress past harm. Because Plaintiffs’ harm is ongoing, that argument fails. See McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 284–85 (2d Cir. 2004); see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 553 n.15 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Only Plaintiffs’ alleged injury in fact, then, is at issue in our analysis.
