the future, either in connection with the fleet itself or independently.
It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet. These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone.
It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in connection with unexpected enemy developments.
It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the sub- marine zone.
When notified that the Chester, Birmingham, and Salem were available_for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at dispersing the Allied sea forces.
In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats of the Sacramento class, it was recom- mended that they be based on Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are urgently needed in critical areas to the northward.
13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place in which protection is necessary that is, where the enemy is operating and must continue to operate in force.
As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone- in fact are being attacked solely in that zone, and must continue
