son's brigade was ordered to advance, when it received positive orders from Sir H. Burrard not to move. Ferguson begged that he might do so on his own responsibility — not one step of concession could this message obtain. Sir A. Wellesley rode up, and asked if it was in orders that the troops should not advance. Angry words then passed, but not a move was made.'
After observing that the British force was comparatively fresh, that the reserves were at hand with an ample supply of stores and ammunition, that meat and biscuits for two days were in every haversack, and that the enemy were in a state of complete demoralisation, Hardinge justly condemns this inactivity. The enemy had lost 3000 men and all their guns; their columns were three miles asunder, while they had to march eight miles to reach Torres Vedras. Hardinge maintains that an advance would in all probability have put the finishing stroke to a glorious victory. He declares that from 1 p.m. on that day the murmurs of the army were loud and deep, that the officers of Sir A. Wellesley 's corps were disgusted, and that inefficiency in council was apparent in every day's orders.
The victory at Vimiera led to the Convention of Cintra, concerning which there was much discussion when the news reached England, and which its advocates had no easy task in defending.
At the close of the year 1808 Hardinge was so far recovered from bis wound as to be able to carry
