Page:Vol 5 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/386

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366
CAMPAIGN ON THE RIO GRANDE.

But a similar proposal on the part of the American general had been rejected by Ampudia more than a month before, and Taylor, under the changed aspect of affairs, was no longer disposed to suspend operations. He declined to listen to the proposal; the possession of Matamoros he said was now a sine qua non; he, however, said that Arista might withdraw his forces, leaving behind the public property of every description.[1] Meantime Arista experienced all the bitterness attending defeat. Resentful murmurs against his conduct were no longer confined to the soldiery; the officers openly commented with severity on his line of action, while he, shutting himself up in his house, sought to ease his mortification by calling his soldiers cowards and coarsely insulting them.[2] Thus all harmony between the general and his division was interrupted by a quagmire of mutual disgust, into which even the most moderate of his subordinates were drawn. On the 10th he had convened a council of his chief officers, but this did not mend matters. With angry threats he denounced the criticisms against him,[3] and then with puerile imprudence fully exposed the demoralized condition of his army, and the impossibility of attempting the defence of Matamoros.[4] When Requena returned from his unsuccessful mission, Arista's decision was made. Leaving behind his sick and wounded, to the number of 500,[5] spiking what artillery he could not take

  1. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.
  2. 'Diciendo que á cada soldado se le podian poner unas enaguas y otros denuestos así.' Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte, 22.
  3. 'Manifestó que estaba pronto á batirse con todas las clases de la division, pues dijo era ya necesario andar con el sable en la mano para el oficial y para el soldado.' Id., 22-3.
  4. This meeting, remarks the author of the Campaña just quoted, had a worse result than the disaster of the 9th. The division became thereby informed that it was without support, that there were only provisions enough to last for a few days and ammunition for a few hours; that Matamoros could only be put in a state of defence at the cost of much time and labor; and that no portion of the army could rely upon any other for support, as the whole was demoralized.
  5. 'Siendo 321 heridos y los demas de otras enfermidades.' Official report no. 3 in Id. Taylor says 'more than 300 of the enemy's wounded have been left in the hospitals.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.