advantages the besieged might have obtained better results. As it was, the day cost them about 600 lives, while the more exposed republicans counted their losses above a thousand, including several hundred prisoners.[1]
Then followed days of inaction,[2] during which the besiegers hemmed in the town closer than ever, afterward directing their batteries against the houses. At first the inhabitants kept in retirement as much as possible, but gradually they became so used to the whizzing messengers that the women and children returned to their accustomed haunts, notwithstanding the casualties, and the cafés were thronged with newsmongers, especially after a day's struggle.
Marquez again brought to bear upon Maximilian his project for a retreat to Mexico, sustained to some extent by Mendez and Mejía, who felt discouraged at the prospect of a long siege;[3] but Miramon and others stoutly opposed him in a council held on the
- ↑ Arias admits 264 killed, 272 wounded, and 419 captured and missing. The report in Bol. Noticias, April 12th, says 750 captives. For details, see Arellano, Ult. Horas, 56-65; Peza and Pradillo, Max., 33-8; Hans, Quer., 89-98; Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 56-72, with special attention to the bridge fight; Marquez, Refut., 69-4. Medals and promotions now came freely, and SalmSalm claims to have obtained the command of a brigade for his share, but this Peza denies. The general of division, Casanova, and the brigadiers Herrera and Calvo, were removed for inefficiency, or rather because they were Miramon's friends, says Arellano, the enemy of Marquez. Arias avoids disagreeable details, and in Vigil the account is too partial.
- ↑ A proposal to act upon the demoralization among the besiegers before they received further reënforcements was opposed by Marquez, yet Miramon carried his point for a movement to recover the hill of San Gregorio, although it was deferred for the 17th. When the time arrived for the sally, a false alarm came that the convent was threatened, and confusion during the march of the reserves arose to prevent the manœuvre, greatly to the disgust of Miramon, who felt sure of a triumph. Hans, Quer., 108-9. Maximilian was equally angry, and caused Mendez to be transferred from the reserves and placed under Miramon direct, in command of Casanova's late division. The traitor Lopez was promoted to the reserve. Arellano, Ult. Horas, 74, claims that both the failure of the movement and the change of commanders were part of Marquez' plot. The latter ridicules the whole charge, and declares that he objected to Lopez. Basch, Erinn., Ï. 52, writes that Miramon was allowed to oversleep himself, and thus he failed to coöperate, adds Arrangoiz. Méj., iv. 275.
- ↑ Arellano maintains that Maximilian had been persuaded to prepare for evacuation, but that Miramon, and above all himself, managed to overrule the 'suicidal' plan. 'Behold their wisdom!' observes Marquez, in alluding to the fall of Querétaro and its results.
