surplus earnings in those ways, a good deal was put into the accumulation of stocks of the products, which subsequently was lost through shrinkage of value; and a portion was reserved to insure the maintenance of dividends as a whole. Up to the present time it has been possible to a large extent to apply that theory. For example, the iron and steel companies have been able to continue payment of their dividends although current earnings have been quite insufficient for that purpose. On the other hand, the copper producing companies, with but few exceptions, have been obliged to discontinue the payment of dividends, in spite of their large book surpluses.
It is a question that it remains for the future to solve whether the mining companies of the United States did not lose through the consequences of the war a good deal more than they profited during the war. The answer to this question will have to be deferred until some years have run on and we can see how long will be the period of no net earnings and suspension of dividends. I lean to the opinion that the actual depreciation in the value of the mines of the United States by depletion from 1916 to 1920 is more than the $600,000,000 that I have herein estimated.
My inventory does not include anything for the known mineral wealth of the country that is not the present source of earnings except insofar as such value is compounded in the thought that these reserves are going to be drawn upon during the estimated period of 30 years. This thought, however, does not include any allowance for expanding production, corresponding with general growth in industry. There is therefore an element of wealth, which has an actual and very
