the following pungent remark: “As head of the Government’s greatest business enterprise, I say frankly that Government operation is poison ivy in the garden of industry.”
The situation in shipping as outlined above is obviously so chaotic that any estimation of value of the American fleet at the present time is largely conjectural and may be quite controversial. The tonnage of 8,450,000 (a round figure) in 1916 may be valued roughly at $80 per ton, or $676,000,000. In 1921 we had a total of 18,350,000 tons, of which 8,000,000 was Government owned. The forecast that we shall have to throw away 6,000,000 tons, leaving the nation with a fleet of 10,450,000 tons and that its average value will be about $50 per ton, or a total of $522,500,000 looks reasonable.
At first sight it may appear paradoxical that from 1916 to 1921 we increased hugely the physical volume of our shipping and yet suffered a monetary loss in inventory in doing so. The explanation of this is that from 1914 to 1916 ships had already increased greatly in value. In 1914 Great Britain’s fleet stood on her merchants’ books at far less than $60 per ton. Ships had been built to give employment in dull times at less than half that figure. The estimation of $80 per ton for 1916 already includes a writing up. At the present time the enormous extent to which the world’s shipping is overbuilt implies low market values for many years to come. By far the major part of the American Government’s expenditure for ships must be viewed simply as one of the wastes of the war. It was an economic crime, a political deception, and a fraud upon the people that the building of these ships con-
