clear, namely, unemployment for their workers who are being undersold by the Germans. This is the meaning of the depreciation of the German mark, which affects not only the credit of nations but also affects the open markets of the world and reduces the opportunities for the disposition of American goods in them.
The German debt on reparation account was fixed by the London agreement at 132 billion gold marks, plus the Belgian debt which amounted to about 2,500,000,000 francs in gold. The annuity amounted to two billion gold marks per annum, plus a tax of 26 per cent on exports. Bonds in three series were to be issued to cover the remaining obligations. By the supplementary Wiesbaden agreement as between Germany and France, Germany was permitted to pay in goods up to the value of one billion gold marks per annum, to a total of seven billion gold marks. This compromise was brought about by the obvious inability of the Germans to continue their reparation payments in full in gold.
It would be foolish to disregard the inevitable effect upon the commerce and industry of the whole world of the activity of a highly organized industrial nation of 70,000,000 people when compelled to produce goods for export, under strain and at the sacrifice of their own previous scale of living. The allies said practically to Germany “It is your fate to work for us, produce the goods that the world wants and pay to us everything above your bare living expenses in satisfaction of our claims for the damage that you have caused us.” But in making that demand they overlooked the obvious, viz. that the enforcement of such a policy
