under a single management, eliminating the wastes of long-hauling, roundabout-hauling, cross-hauling, etc. but instead of such economy we saw within a year or two that about 2,300,000 men were being required to perform substantially the same service that was previously rendered by about 1,800,000.
Speaking generally, and in the broadest terms, I think that it is probable that the result of the war was impairment in the world’s ability to produce rather than improvement. If that be so, and most of the evidence supports the idea, there was not even the germ of rationality in the expectation that a result of the war would be a new and higher scale of living for the world. The higher scale of living that has been temporarily enjoyed by a good many people has been at the expense of their principal, as a whole. An individual can temporarily live luxuriously by mortgaging his property and lavishing the proceeds on consumption goods. But after the proceeds have been spent, what then? There can be no doubt respecting the impoverishment of Europe in capital goods as a result of the war. There has been an impoverishment also in the United States, but not so much as m Europe. Our agricultural lands have deteriorated in fertility since 1916. Our buildings have depreciated by more than the amount of new construction. Our railways have run down physically and our highways have worn out. Our mines have been depleted and our stocks of goods have shrunk. Dr. B. M. Anderson, economist of the Chase National Bank, in a recent contribution said the following:
“The physical condition of our capital equipment probably deteriorated very substantially in 1919.
