Gorsuch, J., dissenting
the claim.” Petrella, 572 U. S., at 670, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have said, however, that the rule is not “applicable across all contexts.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 27 (2001). Far from it: Unless the statute at hand directs otherwise, we proceed consistent with traditional equitable practice and ordinarily apply the discovery rule only “in cases of fraud or concealment.” Ibid. We have long warned lower courts, too, against taking any more “expansive approach to the discovery rule.” Rotkiske, 589 U. S., at 14; see TRW Inc., 534 U. S., at 27–28.
There is little reason to suppose the Copyright Act’s provisions at issue in this case contemplate any departure from the usual rules. Section 507(b) provides that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained … unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” As the Court observed in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., standard language like that calls for the application of the standard incident of injury rule: “A copyright claim thus arises or ‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs,” not at some later date. 572 U. S., at 670. What this should mean for the case before us seems equally evident: Because everyone agrees Sherman Nealy filed suit more than three years after many of Warner Chappell’s alleged infringing acts, see ante, at 2, some (if not all) of his claims are untimely. Everyone agrees, too, that he has not alleged any fraud or concealment that would entitle him to equitable tolling. See Brief for Petitioners 39; Brief for Respondents 50–51. The discovery rule thus has no role to play here—or, indeed, in the mine run of copyright cases.
In one sense, the Court’s decision to pass over this complication may be understandable. After all, none of the parties before us questioned the application of a discovery rule in proceedings below, but joined issue only over how it should work. See ante, at 5, n. 1. And the Court may, as it does, resolve the parties’ dispute while leaving for another day the antecedent question whether a discovery rule exists
