Page:Whole works of joseph butler.djvu/326

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295
THE FIRST LETTER.

different; since likewise it is no immediate consequence, that because either may be supposed to exist independent from the other, therefore the other may be supposed not to exist at all; how is what was proposed, proved? That the propositions are different, I think is plain; and whether there be an immediate connection, everybody that reads your book must judge for themselves. I must say, for my own part, the absurdity does not appear at first sight any more than the absurdity of saying, that the angles below the base in the isosceles triangle are unequal; which, though it is absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay down the contrary for an axiom; because, though it is true, yet there is need of a proof to make it appear so.

Perhaps it may be answered, that I have not rightly explained the words, to exist alone; and that they do not mean only, to exist independent from the other; but that, existing alone, means that nothing exists with it. Whether this or the other was meant, I cannot determine; but, whichever it was, what I have said will hold. For if this last be the sense of those words, [they either of them may be supposed to exist alone,] it indeed implies that it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist; but then I ask, how come these two propositions to be connected; that, to suppose two different natures existing of themselves necessarily and independent from each other implies that each of them may be supposed to exist alone, in this sense?. Which is exactly the same as I said before, only applied to different sentences. So that, if existing alone be understood as I first took it, I allow it is implied in the supposition; but cannot see that the consequence is, that it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist. But if the words, existing alone, are meant in the latter sense, I grant, that if either of them may be supposed thus to exist alone, it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist: but then I cannot see, that to suppose two different natures existing, of themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, implies that