THE THIRD LETTER.
Reverend Sir,—I don't very well understand your meaning when you say that you think, in the order of my ideas, I first conceive a being (finite suppose) to exist, and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being. If you mean, that I first suppose a finite being to exist I know not why; affirming necessity of existence to be only a consequent of its existence; and that, when I have supposed it finite, I very safely conclude it is not infinite; I am utterly at a loss upon what expressions in my letter this conjecture can be founded. But if you mean, that I first of all prove a being to exist from eternity, and then, from the reasons of things, prove that such a being must be eternally necessary; I freely own it. Neither do I conceive it to be irregular or absurd; for there is a great difference between the order in which things exist, and the order in which I prove to myself that they exist. Neither do I think my saying a necessary being exists somewhere, supposes it to be finite; it only supposes that this being exists in space, without determining whether here, or there, or everywhere.
To my second objection, you say, That which exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing, as a sine quâ non; in the sense space is necessary to everything: which is proved (you say) by this consideration, that space is a property of the self-existent substance; and being both necessary in itself, and needful to the existence of everything else; consequently the substance, of which it is a property, must be so too. Space, I own, is in one sense a property of the self-existent substance; but, in the same sense, it is also a property of all other substances. The only difference is in respect to the quantity. And since every part of space, as well as the whole, is necessary, every substance consequently must be self-existent, because it hath this self-existent property; which, since you will not admit for true, if it directly follows from your argument, they cannot be conclusive.
