ditors and others, was held to extend by the general words to a gift made to defraud the queen of a forfeiture[1].
5. One part of a ſtatute muſt be ſo conſtrued by another, that the whole may (if poſſible) ſtand: ut res magis valeat, quam pereat. As if land be veſted in the king and his heirs by act of parliament, ſaving the right of A; and A has at that time a leaſe of it for three years: here A ſhall hold it for his term of three years, and afterwards it ſhall go to the king. For this interpretation furniſhes matter for every clauſe of the ſtatute to work and operate upon. But
6. A saving, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void. If therefore an act of parliament veſts land in the king and his heirs, ſaving the right of all perſons whatſoever; or veſts the land of A in the king, ſaving the right of A: in either of theſe caſes the ſaving is totally repugnant to the body of the ſtatute, and (if good) would render the ſtatute of no effect or operation; and therefore the ſaving is void, and the land veſts abſolutely in the king[2].
7. Where the common law and a ſtatute differ, the common law gives place to the ſtatute; and an old ſtatute gives place to a new one. And this upon the general principle laid down in the laſt ſection, that “leges poſteriores priores contrarias abrogant.” But this is to be underſtood, only when the latter ſtatute is couched in negative terms, or by it’s matter neceſſarily implies a negative. As if a former act ſays, that a juror upon ſuch a trial ſhall have twenty pounds a year; and a new ſtatute comes and ſays, he ſhall have twenty marks: here the latter ſtatute, though it does not expreſs, yet neceſſarily implies a negative, and virtually repeals the former. For if twenty marks be made qualification ſufficient, the former ſtatute which requires twenty pounds is at an end[3]. But if both acts be merely affirmative, and the
