Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol I).djvu/185

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Ch. 2.
of Persons.
169

being attended in an unuſual manner; and expreſſly provides, that no other matter ſhall be treated of in that aſſembly, ſave only the election, on pain of incurring a praemunire.

V. The peculiar laws and cuſtoms of the houſe of commons relate principally to the raiſing of taxes, and the elections of members to ſerve in parliament.

First, with regard to taxes: it is the antient indiſputable privilege and right of the houſe of commons, that all grants of ſubſidies or parliamentary aids do begin in their houſe, and are firſt beſtowed by them[1]; although their grants are not effectual to all intents and purpoſes, until they have the aſſent of the other two branches of the legiſlature. The general reaſon, given for this excluſive privilege of the houſe of commons, is, that the ſupplies are raiſed upon the body of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone ſhould have the right of taxing themſelves. This reaſon would be unanſwerable, if the commons taxed none but themſelves: but it is notorious, that a very large ſhare of property is in the poſſeſſion of the houſe of lords; that this property is equally taxable, and taxed, as the property of the commons; and therefore the commons not being the ſole perſons taxed, this cannot be the reaſon of their having the ſole right of raiſing and modelling the ſupply. The true reaſon, ariſing from the ſpirit of our conſtitution, ſeems to be this. The lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleaſure by the king, are ſuppoſed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue ſo, than the commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would therefore be extremely dangerous, to give them any power of framing new taxes for the ſubject: it is ſufficient, that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the commons too laviſh or improvident in their grants. But ſo reaſonably jealous are the commons of this valuable privilege, that herein they will not ſuffer the other houſe to exert any power but that of rejecting;

  1. 4 Inſt. 29.
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